Using data obtained in a controlled ad-auction experiment that we ran, we evaluate the regret-based approach to econometrics that was recently suggested by Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (EC 2015). We found that despite the weak regret-based assumptions, the results were (at least) as accurate as those obtained using classical equilibrium-based assumptions. En route we studied to what extent did humans actually minimize regret in our ad-auction, and found a significant difference between the "high types" who indeed rationally minimized regret and the "low types" that significantly over-bid. We suggest that correcting for these biases may improve the accuracy of estimated values.
Introduction
The field of econometrics combines observational data with specific modeling assumptions in order to estimate parameters of interest. It goes beyond mere statistical analysis in that it assumes specific models of how the parameters of interest relate to the type of data observed. On the one hand, these assumptions provide power to econometric analysis by allowing it to estimate parameters that do not directly appear in the data, and, on the other hand, the correctness of the whole estimation strongly depends on the correctness of the utilized model, i.e., on the extent to which the situation at hand indeed conforms to the theoretical model.
In game-like scenarios, typical models assume that players are at an equilibrium. This is of course not a trivial assumption as we know that humans are not fully rational and certainly do not always "find" an equilibrium point (see, e.g., [7, 6] and the references therein). Beyond the usual human lack of rationality, equilibrium assumptions are especially hard to justify in complex scenarios such as those found in electronic auctions. This may be due to a variety of reasons such as computational hardness, dependence on private information or the prior, non-intuitiveness of the situation, cognitive burden, or repeated aspects of the game.
A recent paper [11] suggested using a much weaker assumption than the equilibrium assumption. This was demonstrated in the specific context of adauctions, but can be applied to every repeated game scenario. The weaker assumption that they promoted was that players minimize regret in the specific sense used in the regret-minimization literature (sometimes known as "Hannan consistent"). This notion assumes that players manage to achieve at least as much utility as they could have gotten from playing any fixed action repeatedly. This makes minimal assumptions about the players' learning and rationalizing ability. Certainly, if the players reach a Nash equilibrium, they must all be minimizing their regrets, but the regret-minimization assumption is strictly weaker and, for example, holds even if the players reach any equilibrium from the much wider families of correlated or even coarse equilibria.
In [11] , ad-auction data from Microsoft was analyzed under this assumption with the goal of estimating advertisers' values that are not known to the search engine (Microsoft), using the bids that are known to the search engine. Classic econometric methods were applied to this task in [14] and [1] , and the innovation in [11] was to show how the regret-minimization assumption suffices for this estimation. The average value estimates that were obtained in [11] seemed to be more or less in line with those from [14] and [1], but since their data-set lacked the real values of the advertisers it is not clear how well did each of these three econometric methods do, and, in particular, it is not clear how good are the estimates that were obtained based on the weak regret-minimization assumption.
It turned out that we had previously performed an experiment that had yielded exactly the type of data that can allow evaluation of the success of econometric methods in an ad-auction context. 
Our Experiment
We performed a controlled experiment where human subjects were asked to participate in a simulation of ad auctions, similar to those held by search engines like Google or Microsoft. This experiment was described in [12] , which contains all the details as well as the results. In the experiment, we recruited participants in groups of five. In each instance of the experiment, the five participants simulated the roles of advertisers and had to compete in a stream of ad-auctions that lasted 25 minutes. We used a flexible auction experimentation software platform that we developed that enabled us to control the auction details as well as the players' knowledge and values. The auctions were conducted continuously, one auction per second; thus there were 1500 auctions within the 25-minute game. The participants could modify their bids any time, and each auction was performed with the current settings of the bids. Each player was assigned a "type" at random where his type was his "valuation," i.e., the monetary value that he obtained from each user who clicked on his ad (we used 21, 27, 33, 39, 45 "coins"). Each ad auction sold five ad positions with varying Click Through Rates (CTR) (we used 2%, 11%, 20%, 29%, 38%), and every time an advertiser with a valuation v won a position whose CTR was α, he got an income of α · v from that auction. This income was added to his balance and the appropriate payment according to the auction rule was deducted from his balance. The players were given a graphical user interface in which they could modify their bids as often as they wished, and follow the results of the auctions so far. Figure 1 shows a screen shot of the user interface.
The experiment had a two-way (2x2) design; thus there were four experimental conditions. The two factors were: 1. Payment Rule: We compared the (theoretically appealing) VCG payment rule with the (commonly used) GSP payment rule (see [4, 14] ).
Valuation Knowledge:
While the starting point of analyzing behavior in auctions is the "valuation" of the bidder, it is questionable to what extent users are explicitly aware of this valuation. We compared the case where bidders were directly given their valuation (given-value, GV) and were explained its significance, and the case where bidders were not directly given the valuation, but rather only see their payoffs -information from which the valuation may be deduced, but could alternatively be directly used to guide the bidding (deduced-value, DV).
There were a total of 24 experimental sessions, 6 sessions for each of the 4 experimental conditions (thus there were 12 sessions for each factor). The groups (of five players each) were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions, giving a total of n = 120 participants. For further details regarding the experimental setup see Section 2.
Out of the various results of this experiment, let us mention two that have particular relevance to the question at hand regarding the assumptions of the econometric model. The first result is that players in no way seemed to converge to an equilibrium. In fact, players kept modifying their bids throughout the 25 minutes, and the frequency of bid modification increased over time. Figure 2 shows the average activity level (i.e., frequency of bid (a) By mechanism conditions (b) By value-information conditions Figure 4 : Relative momentary regret over time, according to the two experimental factors. The momentary regret is the gap, computed separately for each minute, between the utility achieved by the players and the utility that would have been achieved if they had played the fixed strategy that was optimal for that minute. modification) as a function of time in the four experimental conditions. This was true in all auction formats, even when using the VCG auction rule with explicitly given valuations for which truthful bidding is a dominant strategy so we could have expected a truthful bidding as a strong and stable equilibrium prediction.
On the other hand, despite any lack of convergence to equilibrium, it seems that the auction was able to quickly achieve close to the "correct" (social-welfare maximizing) allocation of the slots, attaining over 80-90% of the optimal level of welfare 2 towards the end of the session (see Figure 3 ), as well as extracting revenue that matches and even exceeds the theoretically expected revenue. This suggests that the different auction formats were able to extract the value information from the users and utilize it, despite not having reached an equilibrium. This would thus seem to indicate that it should be possible to deduce the (hidden) value information from the (visible) auction bids, even though an equilibrium assumption does not seem to hold.
For more information about the details and findings of the experiment see [12] .
To What Extent Do Humans Minimize Regret?
The first question that we looked at was to what extent is it true that bidders in ad-auctions minimized regret? I.e. we compared the actual utility achieved by each one of our participants to the optimal utility he could have achieved had he played an optimal fixed bid (against the same sequence of bids of the others as happened in the original auction). For the VCG auction formats that optimal fixed bid is certainly the dominant strategy of bidding the true value, but for the GSP auction formats the optimal bid depends on the bids of the other players and is only evident in hindsight (and thus could not even theoretically be known to our bidders in real time.)
In order for any regret minimization to be possible, we would need to see some learning by the bidders as time progresses, and indeed that is what we find. Figure 4 shows the "relative momentary regret" of the players over time for the two experimental factors (VCG vs. GSP and given vs. deduced values), where the "momentary regret" is the gap, separately in each minute, between the utility achieved by the player and what would have been achieved by the fixed strategy that is optimal for that minute (presented relative to this optimal outcome, see Section 3 for the formal definitions). As expected, we see the regret decreasing over time in all auction formats. Also, as expected, we see that the GSP auction is more difficult for the bidders than the VCG auction and that the deduced value scenario is more difficult than the known value scenario. Yet we clearly see how even in the GSP auction players were able to learn the behavior of their opponents, and even in the deduced value scenario they were able to learn their own valuation. From this point on, we view the first half of the 25 minutes (750 auctions) as a "learning phase" and focus our analysis on the second half (750 auctions). Qualitatively, our findings are robust to modifications of this definition of the initial learning phase. See Section 4 for more details.
At this point we can go and answer the question of to what extent is it true that bidders in ad-auctions minimized regret, at least after the initial learning phase? We found that to a pretty large extent. In all auction formats the total regret achieved after the initial learning phase is quite low: a 10-20% loss. The GSP auction with deduced values, where players needed to learn both their own values and their opponents' behavior, emerges as yielding more regret than the other three auction formats. Figure 5a shows the regret in the different experimental conditions during the second half of the auctions' 25 minutes, as percentages of the related optimal outcomes. : Relative total regret of the bidders according to experimental conditions and according to types of players. The total regret is computed over the second half of the auctions game (750 auctions), and is presented as a percentage of the corresponding optimal outcome. We should also note here that the regret is positive: in principle it is possible to achieve negative regret (in the GSP auction) using time-varying bids. Yet not a single one of the 60 players who participated in our GSP auctions managed to achieve negative total regret. I.e., none of our players managed to utilize the dynamics in the repeated game to their advantage.
It turns out that the average low regret achieved by players hides, however, a significant difference between different types of players. As mentioned above, the "type" of each player in our auction was his value, which was chosen at random from the set of possible values (of 21, 27, 33, 39, 45 "coins"). If we look at the total regret of the players according to their type, a completely different picture emerges ( Figure 5b ): players with high values have very low regret, while players with low values have very high regret. 3 We see that players who were given (by chance) a low type turn out to play significantly less rationally than players with a high type. While we were surprised at first to see such a significant gap, at second thought this behavior seems quite intuitive: when the low-value players play rationally they tend to "lose" in the auction, i.e., win the low CTR slots. This is quite frustrating and so they keep trying to "win," but to no avail since they "should" be losing the auction according to their true value.
This gap in rational play between types of players is consistent with other Figure 6 : Average total regret as a function of value according to player types and experimental conditions. The value that gives the minimal total regret for a player is given as the estimate for the player's value.
irrational behaviors reported in [12] -overbidding and high frequency of bid changes -that were correlated with the player types. It may be interesting to relate this to other settings where it was found that "the poor act nonrationally" (see, e.g., [2, 3, 13] ), but in our controlled setting the "irrational" behavior cannot be explained by any characteristics of the poor themselves (e.g., lower education), but rather just on the situation in which they found themselves. These findings may be explained in terms of "auction fever" [8, 5] , or by a higher mental burden for the "poor" than for the "rich" [10] , or as a form of an "illusion of control" bias [9] , or having a stronger bias toward "winning".
How Good is Regret-Based Econometrics?
We are now ready to get to the bottom line: how well does this regret-based method estimate the real values of the bidders? Let us first formally specify the regret-based estimation procedure, called "Regret-Minimization," which is carried for each player separately. Let us define Regret i ((b t ) t |v) to be the regret that player i that (perhaps counterfactually) has value v would feel in a sequence of auctions, where (b t ) t denotes the sequence of bid profiles played in these auctions. That is, that a player with value v gets in the t'th round of the auction sequence, if he bids b and the other players bid b t −i , as they did in the real auction. In the case of VCG auctions, we know that bidding b = v is a dominant strategy, and so we know that the maximum is achieved at b = v, but for the GSP auction format we need to try all values of b for each given v. Our estimate of the value v would just be the one that minimizes this regret: 4 v i = arg min v Regret i ((b t ) t |v). As mentioned above, in our implementation we treated the first half of the auctions game as the initial learning phase and used the second half in our regret calculations (a total of 750 auctions). Figure 6 plots the regret results as a function of v for each one of the player types and experimental conditions. The minimum that will serve as our estimate is clearly visible. For the full definitions and details of implementation, see Section 3.
We wish to assess the quality of this regret-based estimation and compare it to other classic econometric methods. Our basic measure of error is the sum of the squares of the relative estimation errors. Specifically, for every player i whose true value is v i , we compute the relative estimation error:
is the value estimate for player i. The estimation error on a set of players S is defined as error(S) = 1 |S| ( i∈S error 2 i ). The same regret-based estimation method works for both the VCG and GSP auctions, with the payment rule taken into account in the calculation of the utilities, U i (b, b t −i |v). However, as these auctions have different equilibria, classical equilibria-based econometric methods will use different estimations for the two auction formats. We will thus look separately at the two auction formats.
We start by considering the VCG auction in the two information scenarios: explicitly given preferences (GV) and deduced preferences (DV). The usual econometric treatment will note that players all have dominant strategies, so it should be a very strong prediction that they all bid these dominant strategies in equilibrium. The classical econometric method will thus take as the model that each player bids his true value in each round, plus an error
where v i is the true value and b t i is the bid in round t. The estimate of the hidden value v i from the visible data of the b t i 's, would bev i = ( T t=1 b t i )/T , as this average minimizes the sum of the squares of t i : Figure 7 compares the error of the regret-based method with those of the classic one ("Average-Bid"). All in all, the two methods give very similar errors of around 20-25%. The estimation errors of both methods are somewhat larger in the deduced-value setting than in the given-value one and the regret-based method seems somewhat better in the former setting and somewhat worse in the latter, however these effects were not statistically significant. As expected from the fact that we have already seen that the "low types" deviate significantly from playing rationally, the estimation errors on the low types are far larger than those on the high types, and this is statistically significant for both methods. See Section 5 for more details.
For the GSP auction the situation is much more complicated for equilibriumbased econometric methods since there are no dominant strategies and there exist multiple equilibria. There are two basic approaches in the literature. In [14] it is suggested that the players should reach the "VCG-like" equilibrium of the full-information auction. Assuming that this is indeed the case, then at each time step t one may deduce values v t i for all players i from the actual bids b t i , so that the bids are this full-information equilibrium of these deduced values. The final estimate is then the average of these calculated v t i . Some complications arise when this is attempted on real data since it is often the case that the bids are not consistent with the equilibrium model; handling these cases and other complications of the "VCG-like-NE" method is discussed in [14] and below in Section 6.
A more complex method was suggested by [1] where the basic assumption is that each player is best-responding to the distribution he faces. Specifically, this "Best-Response" method assumes that players best-respond by taking into account the following two functions of their bid: the expected CTR of the position they win and their expected payment. Against smooth distributions the best bid would be a strictly increasing function of the value so the single value that corresponds to the actual bid may be served as the value estimate. Details of implementation and complications of this method are discussed in [1] and in Section 6. Figure 8 compares the estimation error of the regret-based method with those of the two "classical" equilibrium-based methods. The three methods yield similar estimation errors, with the regret-based method seeming to be slightly better, but not in a statistically significant way. In all three methods the estimation errors are somewhat larger in the deduced-value setting, in which case the regret-based method has an advantage over the other two methods; while this appeared to be quite consistent, it was not statistically significant. As expected from the fact that we have already seen that the "low types" deviate significantly from playing rationally, the estimation errors on the "low" types are far larger than those on the high types, and this is statistically significant for each of the three methods. For more details see Section 7.
Conclusions and Further Directions
We have demonstrated that, at least in our repeated ad-auction experiment, players do minimize their regret to a reasonable degree, and that the regretbased method suggested by [11] for estimating players' values from their bids is (at least) competitive with "classical" equilibrium-based econometric Figure 9 : Average of value estimates: the average estimates of (9a) VCG bidders, and (9b) GSP bidders, using each of the estimation methods that we tried. The results are presented according to the five types of players, alongside their true values. The significance of the distances between the estimates is presented in Tables 12 and 16, for VCG and for GSP, respectively. methods. We find this to be especially significant due to the generality and simplicity of the regret-based method: while "classical econometric methods" required choosing between different interpretations of equilibria in GSP auctions as well as among many significant implementation details and to tailor the method to the specific equilibrium assumptions, the regret-based econometric method did not require any specific tailoring and hence was much easier to specify and implement. We furthermore speculate that this simplicity may reasonably allow this method to be further improved, and we sketch two approaches of this form (one successful and one not) in Section 8. Obviously, further evaluation of the regret-based method, in more scenarios, is called for.
En route we have also identified a distinct human bias that causes irrational bidding in our experiment: players with "low" types tend to overbid leading to high regret, and resulting in increased estimation errors in all the econometric methods that we tried. Figure 9 shows the average estimates according to player types alongside the true values. This seems to be consistent and explainable by known psychological effects but is still remarkable due to the extreme simplicity and clarity of our setting. It is an interesting challenge to use our understanding of this bias to improve our estimates, and Section 8 takes a preliminary look at a simple suggestion in that vein.
Experimental Setup and Procedure
We ran laboratory simulations of ad auction games, in which five human players competed on five ad positions in a continuous sequence of ad auctions. 5 Each game lasted 25 minutes during which 1500 auctions were performed at a rate of one auction per second. Players could continuously change their bids, and each auction was performed using their most updated bids.
The experiment involved a 2x2 between-participants design, giving four experimental conditions. The first factor was mechanism settings: we compared GSP and VCG. The second factor was information structure: players were either directly given their value per click (i.e., Given Value (GV)), or could only indirectly deduce this value (i.e., Deduced Value (DV)). All phases of the experiment -the instructions phase, the ad auctions game, and a short questionnaire run in the end -were conducted using a web application we developed specifically for the experimentation of the sponsored-search auctions environment (see screenshot in Figure 1 ).
The participants simulated the roles of advertisers, competing with the other participants on ad positions for placing their ads on an internet page. In the beginning of each experiment session, each of the five players was randomly assigned a different monetary value from the set: {21, 27, 33, 39, 45}. Each player privately read in the instructions that: "... each click on your ad is worth to you an expected income of V game coins." In the given-value conditions the "V" was replaced with the exact value, while in the deduced-value conditions it remained a placeholder. In both value-information conditions players read that their value remained constant throughout the game, and that it could differ from one player to another.
Each auction sold five ad positions, associated with fixed Click-Through Rates (CTR): {38%, 29%, 20%, 11%, 2%}. Ad positions were displayed in a decreasing order of CTRs, alongside their CTR values, so that the position on the top of the page received the highest CTR. Players learned from the instructions that in each auction, positions were allocated according to the decreasing order of their most recent bids (ties were broken randomly), and that after each auction their resulting payoff (gain minus payment to the search engine) would be added to their total balance. They were told they would be paid for their participation according to their final balance (in addition to a fixed participation payment). This provided genuine incentives for playing the auctions game.
The instructions given in the two mechanism conditions differed in two respects: first, the description of the auction pricing rule was written ac-cording to either the GSP or the VCG mechanism; second, the players were advised about their best strategy in the following way (based on theory): in the VCG condition the players were informed that in each auction, bidding their true value would always be their most beneficial strategy, independent of the other players' bids; the GSP players were informed that the bid that would give them the highest payoff might depend on other players' bids. Such advice was given since we were interested in testing people's behavior when they were aware of the real properties of the auction mechanism.
After all players privately read and correctly answered several comprehension questions, a summary of the instructions was read publicly (skipping the private values), to let the players know it was common knowledge. Then, an initial bidding page was displayed, in which players were asked to state how much they were willing to pay per click for their ad. Once all initial bids were given, the repeated auctions game started.
During the game, players were given a graphical user interface in which they could change their bid as often as they wished, and follow the results of the last (i.e., most recent) auction and the history of the results until then (see screenshot in Figure 1 ). In particular, each player was provided with an input field for updating his bid (restricted to 2 digits before and after the decimal point), with his value per click (only in GV condition), and with the following feedback: his current balance; the payoff and position he had achieved in the last auction instance; the full allocation of ad positions in the last auction (the competitors were represented by colored labels); and three dynamic graphs of his results until then, describing the history of bids, payoffs, and positions. Notice that as in real life, our players were not provided with either the other players' valuations or their bids, and could only infer them from allocation results.
This information was automatically updated either every 6 seconds or after the player changed his bid or after he pressed the "refresh" button. In addition, a timer at the bottom of the screen indicated the remaining time in the game. Finally, after 25 minutes the game was over and each player was shown a summary of his profits. Thereafter players filled out a short questionnaire, after which they were paid privately and had thus completed their participation.
The experiment was conducted during May-June 2013 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The participants were undergraduate students who did not come from any specific discipline. They were run in groups of five in separate sessions that lasted up to 50 minutes each. Each session involved one continuous ad auctions game. There were 6 such sessions in each of the 4 experimental conditions. Thus, all together there were 24 experimental sessions with a total of 120 participants. The average payment for a participant was 65 NIS (18 US dollars).
Regret-Based Estimation
Before we proceed to the regret results in our experiment, let us formally describe how we measured the regret obtained by the bidders, and our implementation of the regret-based procedure of [11] for estimating bidders' valuations from their bids.
Measuring Regret
The Auction
The details of our auctions were summarized in the previous section; here we formalize our notation, so we can describe the regret-based method. At every iteration t = 1...T , where T = 1500, we performed an auction selling a set of K = 5 positions to n = 5 players. The positions have fixed CTRs α 1 > α 2 > α 3 > α 4 > α 5 > 0 (we used α = (38%, 29%, 20%, 11%, 2%)). Each player has a value v i that was assigned to him (in our case v i ∈ {21, 27, 33, 39, 45}).
Let b t = (b t 1 , ..., b t n ) be the bids played at the t'th auction. Let j i = j i (b t ) denote the order statistic of b t i (i.e., the highest bidder i gets j i = 1, the second highest bidder gets j i = 2, etc.), then each bidder i wins slot j i at time t, and so gets α j "clicks" for j = j i and his gain is v i ·α j . 6 The payment p i = p i (b t ) of each player i at time t is computed differently in each of the two auction formats: in the GSP auction p i = b t j+1 · α j , i.e., the player pays the next highest bid (per click); in VCG auctions p i is computed according to the VCG payment rule. The net utility of player i at stage t is then v i · α j − p i .
Utilities
We will present the estimation method in terms of the utilities of the players, U i (b, b t −i |v), which use the following elements:
• i -this is a specific player out of the n players that participate in the game (auction).
• t -the setting is that of a game (auction) that is repeated T times, where t = 1...T is the period number.
• v -this is the (hypothetical) type (value) of the player. The actual value of player i is v i , but we can compute the utility for every possible value v of player i.
• b t -this is the vector of actual bids played by the n players at time t. b t −i denotes the (n − 1)-dimensional vector of bids of the other players (except i).
• b -this is a hypothetical bid that the player could bid. The actual bid that player i made at time t is b t i . In our auctions we have that
, as described in the auction description above. Regret
The regret of a player in a sequence of auctions is the gap between the best utility he could have achieved had he played an optimal fixed bid during that sequence and the utility he actually obtained in that sequence. Thus, player i's actual utility in a sequence of auctions
The optimal utility player i could have obtained by playing a fixed bid repeatedly in all these auctions is
The regret of player i whose value is v i in a sequence of auctions (b t ) t is the difference between his optimal and actual utilities in these auctions
In VCG auctions, truth is a dominant strategy so the utility is maximized by bidding the true value b = v i , independently of other players' bids. However, in GSP auctions, where the optimal bid in every auction depends on the other players' bids, the optimal fixed bid b and the optimal utility can only be computed in hindsight based on the actual bids made by all other players.
We will need to aggregate the regret across different sets of players (e.g., comparing regret in different experimental conditions). The regret of a set S of players is computed in respect to S's optimal and actual utilities, which are the sum over these utilities of all players in S. That is, Actual S = i∈S Actual i , and Opt S = i∈S Opt i . Then, the regret of S at a sequence of auctions (b t ) t is
Since the level of regrets depends on the magnitude of the utilities, we will usually present regret levels as percentages of the corresponding optimal outcomes. Specifically, we define the relative regret of S at a sequence of auctions (b t ) t by,
In the analysis we use two measures of regret: first, to examine changes in regret over time, we define the momentary regret to be the regret in each minute separately, computed according to the optimal fixed bid in that minute. Recall that in our data the auctions were performed over 25 minutes at a rate of one auction per second. Thus, the momentary regret of player i at minute m ∈ [0, 24] is
Second, to examine the overall regret of a player we compute the regret over the second half of the auctions game, excluding the first half as an initial learning phase. That is, the total regret of player i is computed over a sequence of 750 auctions, as follows
We have also tested other selections of the initial learning phase (e.g., excluding the first third of the game), and our results were robust to different choices. As can be seen in Figure 10 , the changes in total regret stabilized so it was possible to choose the end of the initial learning phase at some point after approximately auction 500. Considering also the momentaryregret pattern of results (see Figures 4 and 11) , we chose the first half of the game as this learning.
Again, both momentary regret and total regret are defined for a set of players S just additively over the players in S, and are examined relative to the corresponding optimal outcomes; specifically, the relative momentary regret and the relative total regret of a set of players S are: M omentaryRegret S /Opt S and T otalRegret S /Opt S , respectively. When it will be clear from the context, we will refer to momentary regret and to total regret simply as "regret".
The Regret-Minimization Method
Here we describe the regret-based estimation method suggested by [11] , which we evaluated by applying to our bidders. For this estimation task, we now assume that we observe only the bids played by the bidders and the fixed CTRs. The regret-based estimation method is based on the assumption that players use learning strategies that minimize their regret in the repeated game. That is, they use bidding strategies by which, over time, their utilities are not much worse than the optimal utilities they could have achieved by playing the best fixed bid in hindsight. This assumption is weaker than standard approach in econometrics that relies on the assumption that the observed game reaches a static equilibrium.
This motivates the Regret-Minimization estimation procedure, which is provided in Algorithm 1. The Regret-Minimization procedure is given as input a sequence of bid profiles (b t ) t (in our implementation we chose (b t ) 1500 t=751 , excluding the first half of the game as an initial learning phase, as described above), as well as functions U i (b, b t −i |v) modeling players' utilities. The procedure estimates value v i of each bidder i as follows: it begins by fixing the sets of possible valuations V i and of possible bids B i to consider, which we set as V i = B i = {1, 2, ..., 60} for all bidders. Then, for every possible value v ∈ V i , it computes Regret i ((b t ) t |v) -the regret of player i had his value been v -which in turn requires the computation of Actual i ((b t ) t |v) and
The estimatev i is then the value that minimizes this regret. 7 We applied the Regret-Minimization procedure to each of the bidders in for v ∈ V i do 7:
return the estimatesv 1 , ...,v n 12: end procedure the experiment, and evaluate the accuracy of the estimations in Sections 5 and 7. Figure 6 presents the regret results as a function of value, according to the types of players and the experimental conditions. The minimum point for each player serves as the estimate of his value, and is clearly visible in the graphs. Consistent with the regret-minimization model, this minimum is achieved at a higher value as we move from lower to higher types. Also notice the asymmetry in the slopes of the regret, as well as how it changes between low and high types, indicating that low types would have suffered high regret had their values been higher and lower regret had their values been lower, while the opposite is observed for the highest type.
Do Humans Minimize Regret?
Our main goal in this paper is to evaluate the inference of humans' private valuations that is based on the assumption that they act to minimize regret in the repeated game. Therefore, our first step is to get the feel whether this assumption seems to hold in the experimental data, i.e., whether our participants decreased in regret over time and succeeded in reaching overall low levels of regret.
Regret in the Four Experimental Conditions
We start by examining the regret over time in the different experimental conditions, looking for an evidence that the bidders learned the auctions game with time. Figures 4a and 4b show the relative momentary-regret over time, according to each of the experimental factors: auction mechanism (GSP vs. VCG) and value-information settings (Given vs. Deduced Values).
As expected, in all four experimental conditions, the momentary regret decreased over time. Specifically, the average momentary-regret in the first third of the game is significantly higher than in the last third 8 (N=6 sessions, Wilcoxon paired two-sided signed rank test, p < 0.05 for each condition except for VCG-GV for which p = 0.06). The decrease was faster in the beginning when players acquired experience in the game, and slower thereafter, reaching around 15% regret towards the end of the game. This seems to be consistent with the suggestion raised by [11] , that higher levels of regret may indicate that bidders are in their initial learning phase.
Comparing each factor separately over time, Figure 4 shows that the regret was higher in GSP auctions than in VCG auctions, and higher in DV auctions than in GV auctions, and these differences were consistent throughout the game and across player types. The higher levels of regret mean that players earned less of their optimal earnings. It makes sense that it will be more difficult for players in the GSP auction, where their success depends on the others' bids (relative to VCG auctions where the true value is a dominant strategy), and in DV auctions where they don't know their values and must play only based on the feedback they received (relative to the GV auction where the players knew their private values). However, the differences were larger in the beginning and reduced with time, showing that also in the more difficult settings, GSP and DV, the players succeeded to overcome the gap; specifically, comparing each factor: GSP vs. VCG, and DV vs. GV, in each third of the game, the average momentary-regret was significantly different at the 5% level only in the first third of the game (N=12 sessions, t-test).
Next, we compute the total-regret based on the second half of the game (750 auctions), where regret levels were more stable, indicating that players have completed the initial learning phase and were experienced enough in the game (see Section 3). Figure 5a shows the relative total-regret for each of the experimental conditions. It can be seen that in all four conditions, the total-regret was relatively low with 10-20% loss. The total regret in GSP-DV where bidders needed to learn both their opponents' behavior and their own values, was higher than in the other three conditions, but the difference was statistically significant only in comparison with the GSP-GV condition (N=6 sessions, pairwise comparisons, p < 0.05). Finally, comparing the total regret by experimental factor using a two-way ANOVA, did not reveal significant effect of neither mechanism or value-information setting, supporting that overall players performed similarly in minimizing regret also in the conditions that started as more difficult.
Overall, the decrease in regret over time, and the relatively low levels of total regret in all experimental settings, may suggest that the bidders did act to minimize their regret.
Regret of the Five Types of Players
A different story is revealed when examining bidders by their types: we found that the type of a player, i.e., the value assigned to him at random and was used to determine his payoffs in all auctions, also had a significant effect on his regret-minimization performance. Figure 5b shows the relative total-regret for the five types of players: 21, 27, 33, 39 and 45. It can be seen that the lower the type is the higher the player's total regret, so that the highest type players achieved low levels of regret -less than 6% loss, and the lowest type players remained with very high levels of regret -with more than 50% loss of their optimal outcome. Specifically, there is a significant negative correlation between the player's type and his total regret (N = 120, r = −0.68, p < 0.001). Thus, high levels of regret may indicate not only that a player is in his initial learning phase, as suggested by [11] , but also that he might be of a lower type relative to his opponents. These findings suggest that while higher types succeed in minimizing their total regret the lower types failed to do so.
One-way ANOVA determined a main effect of player type on total regret (F(4,115)=30.63, p < 0.001), and a pairwise comparison showed that the significant differences were obtained when comparing the low and the high types. Specifically, players' total regret of each of the two lowest types (21 and 27) was significantly higher than players' total regret of each of the three highest types (33, 39 and 45) (N=24, post-hoc Tukey, p < 0.001), but the differences between the two lowest types and between the three highest types were not statistically significant. This suggests considering the five types in our experiment as two high-level types of players: "poor" and "rich", with values less and above 30 coins, respectively.
Thus, we see that players who were assigned, by chance, with a "poor" type, played significantly less rationally than the players who were lucky to get a "rich" type. This is also consistent with other irrational behaviors reported in [12] -overbidding and high frequency of bid changes -that were correlated with the player types, and were shown that they could not be explained as some long-term rational strategies in the repeated game. This may be viewed as a new perspective to the widely studied correlation between poverty and counterproductive behaviors (see, e.g., [2, 3, 13] ): merely being poor relative to the others effected players' rationality. The controlled experiment setting proves that these behaviors cannot be explained based on specific characteristics of the poor themselves (e.g., lower education). We suggest that the poor might have other utilities and thus they minimize some other form of regret. This is consistent and may be viewed as a case where the poor have higher mental burden resulting from their inferiority and causes them to perform worse than the rich [10] . One way or another, the high total-regret of the lower types suggest that regret-based econometrics might succeed less on the lower type players.
Examining the momentary-regret over time according to player types, shows that low type players, although remaining with high regret, still succeed in decreasing in regret level as time progressed. Figure 11 shows that momentary regret decreased for all -higher and lower -types of players. Specifically, for each of the five types of players, the average momentaryregret in the first third of the game is significantly higher than in the last third (N=24, Wilcoxon paired two-sided signed rank test, p < 0.001 for each type except for 33 for which p < 0.03).
To conclude, considering regret by types of players suggests that while the regret minimization assumption seems to hold for higher types, lower types succeed less in minimizing their regret and obtain high levels of regret. However, the finding that the lower types still decreased in regret over time suggests that their strategies involve with minimizing their regret, and there-fore -also for them -it might be possible to infer their private valuations based on the regret minimization assumption.
Evaluating Estimations in VCG Auctions
We are now ready to evaluate the success of the Regret-Minimization method in estimating players' private valuations, in comparison with standard econometric methods that rely on the equilibrium assumption. Since GSP and VCG have different equilibria, standard methods use different procedures in the two cases, and thus we perform the evaluation separately for each mechanism, beginning with the VCG auctions. We assess the quality of the estimation methods in percentages based on the mean squares of the relative errors. Specifically, for every player i whose true value is v i , we compute the relativeestimation error: error i = |v i −v i |/v i , wherev i is the value estimate for player i. The estimation error on a set of players S is the average of the squared relative-estimation errors of players in S: error(S) = 1 |S| ( i∈S error 2 i ). According to the standard approach in econometrics that assumes bidders are at an equilibrium, the case of VCG is very clear: since players have a dominant strategy, the prediction is strong that all players should bid their dominant strategy. The VCG is particularly simple since the dominant strategy for a player is simply bidding his true value. Thus, the standard method models player i's bid at every auction t to be his true value plus an error term: b t i = v i + t i . The estimate value for player i in a sequence of T auctions is the average of his bids in these auctions, i.e.v i = 1 T ( T t=1 b t i ), as this average minimizes the sum of squares of these errors: t (v − b t i ) 2 . We applied the Regret-Minimization method and the standard method of taking the average bid ("Average-Bid") to estimate the valuations of the 60 human bidders in the VCG sessions -5 bidders (of 5 types) in each of the 12 sessions. In each session we focus on the second half of the auctions game, which includes a stream of 750 auctions through 12.5 minutes, based on findings described in Section 3 and in [12] that suggest that this excludes the initial learning phase. Figure 9a plots the average estimates of the VCG bidders according to player types, and the significance of differences between the estimates and the true values are presented in Table 12. As can be seen, Regret-Minimization significantly over-estimates the valuations of the three lower-type bidders, and significantly under-estimates the valuations of the highest-type bidders. The direction of mistakes by Regret-Minimization gradually changes from low to high types. These findings suggest that the low type bidders tend to play as if their valuation was higher and the opposite for the bidders with the highest value, who tend to play as if their valuation was lower than it really was. Interestingly, these tendencies do not clearly arise from the average-bid (see Table 12 ), and thus must be hidden in the dynamic strategies played by the players relative to their opponents.
The Regret-Minimization Estimates
Examining estimation errors using the Regret-Minimization method, the findings are consistent with the results in Section 4: first, Figure 7a shows that Regret-Minimization succeeds better in estimating bidders valuations when bidders were given with their valuation (GV) than when they had to deduce their value (DV), but the differences between the two information conditions were not statistically significant. This general pattern of error could be expected, as DV bidders tended to succeed less in minimizing their regret.
Second, considering estimation errors by the different types of players (see Figure 7b ) we see that Regret-Minimization succeeds more in estimating valuations of the higher-type players (who succeeded more in minimizing their regret), than of the lower type players (who remained with high levels of regret, see Section 4), for which it performs very poorly. The estimation error on the lowest-type players is around 40% of their valuation (21 coins). Specifically, there is a significant negative correlation between the estimation error and the player-types (N = 60, ρ = −0.65 and p < 0.001). 1-way ANOVA analysis on player types determines a main effect of player types (p < 0.0001,F = 23.12), and a pairwise comparison shows that the differences were gradual across the types; specifically, differences in errors were statistically significant between type 21 and each of the other types (p < 0.0001), and between types 27 and 39 (p < 0.05). This gradual pattern is consistent (as expected) with the pattern of regret-levels shown in Figure 5b .
Regret-Minimization vs. Average-Bid Overall, considering all 60 VCG bidders, Regret-Minimization and Average-Bid methods perform very similarly, with total estimation errors of 23.37% and 23.38%, respectively. Also the errors of individual players distributed similarly using the two methods, both with high variance between players: µ = 17.69% and σ = 15.39% using Regret-Minimization, and µ = 17.37% and σ = 15.79% using Average-Bid. The similarity persists when considering errors by information setting or by types of players, as can be seen in Figure 7 . Thus, the estimation obtained by the regret-minimization method, which is general for all auction formats, does not fall from the estimation of the standard approach, even though the Figure 12 : Differences Table of VCG bidders for value estimates using Regret-Minimization and Average-Bid methods: the averages and standard deviations of the differences between the value estimates and the true values of the bidders, and the differences between the value estimates using the two methods, as indicated in the first column. Differences that are significantly different from zero are marked by *, **, and *** for significance at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. specific equilibrium prediction for VCG is strong and is of the simple strategy of bidding the true value.
In spite of the similar performance there are consistent differences between the two methods that are worth mentioning. First, although the advantage to Average-Bid in GV setting (see Figure 7a ) was not statistically significant, it was consistent in different selections of auctions sequences (i.e., different selection of learning phase). In contrast, the advantage to Regret-Minimization in the DV setting was not robust to different sequences.
Second, Figure 7b shows that estimations using Regret-Minimization are more accurate on the middle-valued types, while Average-Bid is more accurate on the lower type players, and both methods succeed similarly on the highest-type players. This pattern is robust for selecting different auctions sequences, and for some sequences the interaction between method and player types reaches statistic significance at the 5% level. However, note that the differences in errors between estimation methods for each type separately were not statistically significant. In addition, as opposed to the significant and gradual differences between estimation errors on different types when using Regret-Minimization (see above), when using Average-Bid the differences are only due to the error in estimating the lowest type valuation, which was significantly higher than each of the other types (p < 0.001). Considering this result together with a stronger negative correlation between estimation error and player types observed in Regret-Minimization than in Average-Bid (ρ = −0.65 and ρ = −0.52, respectively, p < 0.001 in both), may suggest that Regret-Minimization is more sensitive to types of players. Finally, examining the difference between bidders' two estimates (see Table 12 ), we see that when a bidder is of a lower type Regret-Minimization tends to estimate higher than the Average-Bid, and tends to estimate lower than the Average-Bid when the bidder is of a higher type.
These consistent differences between the Regret-Minimization and the Average-Bid methods, suggest that we could improve performance by taking advantage of the biases of the different types in the two methods. And indeed, in Section 8 we demonstrate how we may improve the accuracy of estimations by considering these patterns of error.
Summary of Existing Estimation Methods for GSP
The case of GSP auctions is more complicated for standard econometric methods that are based on the equilibrium assumption, since it is less clear to which equilibrium bids should converge; unlike VCG, in GSP players do not have dominant strategies and there might be multiple equilibria which might be complex in the repeated game. There are two main approaches in the literature for deducing bidders' valuations in GSP auctions: the first assumes bidders reach the equilibrium of the full-information game, that gives the VCG-prices (thus "VCG-like" equilibrium) [14, 4] ; the second refers to the uncertainty in the game and assumes bidders best respond to the distributions they experience [1].
6.1
The VCG-like-NE Method 6.1.1 Method Overview [14] and [4] suggested it is reasonable to assume that bids in GSP implement equilibria of the induced full-information one-shot game. They focus on the set of "Symmetric Nash Equilibrium" 9 (SNE), and particularly point to the specific SNE that gives the VCG-equilibrium prices, as the equilibrium that is most plausible to be implemented by the players. [14] suggested a procedure for deducing bounds on valuations assuming bids in every auction are at an SNE, and applied it to actual ad auctions. Here we follow this procedure as the first "classical" equilibrium-based estimation of the bidders' values, that is compared to the Regret-Minimization procedure.
Assuming a given bid profile is an SNE, [14] showed that the bidders' (unobserved) values are bounded by the (observed) incremental cost per click (ICC) of moving up or down one position. Specifically, if (b 1 , ..., b n ) is an SNE (and bids are numbered by decreasing order), then the value v k of the bidder in the k'th (k > 1) position is bounded by
For the highest ranked bidder, this equilibrium assumption does not provide an upper bound, and implies only that his value must be at least as high as the value of the second highest bidder. If the bids are at the VCGlike equilibrium, where prices are minimal among SNE prices, then values equal the upper bound in the inequality, i.e., each value equals the ICC of moving to the next higher position. Applying (1) iteratively in an auction of five players as in our setting, gives that the valuations corresponding to a VCG-like equilibrium bids (b 1 , ..., b 5 ) (in decreasing order) must satisfy the following
When using the ICC to estimate valuations of each of the bidders separately on real data, the estimates do not necessarily satisfy the SNE inequalities in (2) . [14] viewed these inconsistencies as resulting from the gap between the full information case and the uncertainty in real auctions and suggested to resolve them by perturbing the observations, in the "minimal" possible way as to satisfy the equilibrium constraints, and set the final estimates to the perturbed values.
Our Implementation
Algorithm 2 specifies the "VCG-like-NE" estimation procedure, which we applied to each of the GSP experiment sessions, as the first comparison alternative to the regret-based estimation method. As in Regret-Minimization (see Section 3), we focused on the second half of the auctions game, excluding the first half as the initial learning phase (i.e., using (b t ) 1500 t=751 ).
Implementation Remarks
Perturbations When the observed bids b t were not consistent with the SNE model (lines 8-11), we fixed the inconsistencies (i.e., satisfied the equilibrium inequalities in (2)), as in [14] , by perturbing for every bidder i ∈ {2, 3, 4}
Algorithm 2 VCG-like-NE: estimating bidders' valuations in GSP sessions, assuming bids at every auction are at the Nash equilibrium that gives the VCG prices. 
set ICC as in (2) 8:
ifv t is not consistent with (2) then fix inconsistencies 9: d ← GetM inimalP erturbations(b t ) 10:
return the estimatesv 1 , ...,v n 15: end procedure return arg min d i (d i − 1) 2 s.t. for all i:
19: end function the bid that follows him in the ranking of bidders b i+1 , which is the only variable in these inequalities that each bidder could not directly observe. As in [14] , we chose the minimal perturbations by solving the quadratic programming problem in subroutine GetMinimalPerturbations, and set the estimates to the perturbed valuations. Only 13.3% of the auctions were consistent with the equilibrium inequalities without perturbing their data. However, similar to [14] , we observed that the required perturbations were relatively small. Figure 13 shows the distribution of the mean absolute deviation from an SNE in each auction, defined as 1 5 5 i=1 |d i − 1| (setting d 1 = d 5 = 1). The histogram looks similar to the histogram in [14] , with an average of 3.65% and median 2.88%. Interestingly, perturbing the data did not improve estimation results, but, in fact, slightly increased the estimation errors, as can be seen in Figure 14 . Over all 60 GSP bidders, the estimation error was 30.60% when using perturbations and 26.80% using the raw ICC without perturbing the data (the difference was not statistically significant).
Highest Ranked Bidder
The VCG-like-NE method provides only a lower bound for the highest ranked bidder and thus it is unclear what should be the estimation of his value. We tried two reasonable implementations: estimating his value as the second highest value, or as the maximum between the second highest value and his own bid in the auction. We chose the first implementation (in line 12) since it gave a slightly lower estimation error (30.60% vs. 30.76%, respectively, over all GSP bidders).
6.2
The Best-Response Method
Method Overview
[1] suggested a method for deducing bidders' valuations in GSP auctions that takes into account the uncertainty in the game. They consider a framework in which bidders participate in a large number of auctions, and receive feedback that can vary from auction to auction. The basic assumption is that bidders are best responding to the distributions that they experience.
Given a sequence of auctions, define functions Q i (b i ) and T E i (b i ) as the expected CTR and the expected total expenditure, respectively, of bidder i who bids b i through all these auctions, with the expectation taken over the distribution of the uncertainty. Thus, the expected utility of bidder i who bids b i and has value per click v is
With sufficient uncertainty in the environment, these functions are strictly increasing and differentiable in b i . In these cases 10 , the valuation of bidder i who maximizes his expected utility by bidding b i in the auctions' sequence, can be recovered using the first-order condition (FOC), as follows
Note that in order for b i to be a best-response bid for a bidder with value v, it is also required to verify for global optimality of the bid, as (3) guarantees only local optimality.
The original model considers that bidders face uncertainty about "quality scores" 11 and the set of competitors. These specific sources of uncertainty do not exist in our controlled experiment, but the uncertainty in our case is due to the distribution of bids of the other bidders.
Our Implementation
Algorithm 3 specifies the "Best-Response" estimation procedure, which is our implementation of the method suggested by [1], and is the second "classical" equilibrium-based method that we compare with the regret-based estimation. Similar to the Regret-Minimization procedure (see Section 3), we focus on the second half of the game and use (b t ) 1500 t=751 . Figure 15 : Estimation errors of the Best-Response variants over all GSP bidders. The variants are described in Section 6.2.3.
Implementation Variants
One can think of many other implementations to the method suggested by [1] . Figure 15 presents the estimation errors obtained using several of the variants that we have tested, each variant changes the Best-Response procedure in one aspect. The first "FOC" variant that we looked at follows [1] directly and finds the value using the first-order condition in equation (3) rather than using direct search on a grid. This was sensitive to outlier bids and achieved worse estimation results. The "FOC-Excluding-Outliers" presents the estimation errors obtained when modifying the FOC method by removing outliers: computing the average b * i excluding bids b t i that were more than two standard deviations away from the average 1 750 1500 t=751 b t i . Two other variants that we attempted are: (1) the "Full-Game" variant considers the entire game rather than focusing on the second half of the game, and specifically computes for every bidder the average bid b * i and the functions Q i and T E i in respect to the 1500 auctions of the game;
(2) the "Average-Value" variant computes an estimatev t i separately for every auction t (specifically by using b t i rather than b * i , and executing the procedure for every auction t to obtainv t i ), and determines the final estimatev i as the average of these values. This is a different approach for handling the difference from the situation in [1] where bids were assumed to be constant. As can be seen in Figure 15 , these variants were either worse or just marginally better than our choice of the basic "Best-Response" method. The variability does highlight, however, the breadth and significance of implementation details when using this method.
Evaluating Estimations in GSP Auctions
Finally, we are ready to test how good is the regret-minimization method that makes weaker assumptions, in estimating the valuations of the GSP bidders in the experiment, and how does it perform relative to the two prominent methods in the literature that were presented in the previous section. As in evaluating VCG auctions (in Section 5), we assess the quality of the estimation methods in percentages based on the mean squares of the relative errors, i.e., the estimation error on a set of players S is:
Here again we evaluate estimations that were performed on the second half of the auctions game, including 750 auctions during 12.5 minutes, for the 60 human bidders in the GSP sessions -5 bidders (of 5 types) in each of the 12 sessions.
The Regret-Minimization Estimates The average estimates of the GSP bidders according to player types are presented in Figure 9b , and Table 16 presents the statistics of the differences between the estimates and the bidders' true valuations. As can be seen, Regret-Minimization tends to overestimate the valuation of the three lowest types. The estimations of the two highest types are not significantly in a particular direction relative to the true values. The direction of mistakes changes gradually across types, as in the VCG case (Section 5). Thus also in GSP, where bidders are expected to shade their bids, lower types play as if their value was higher, in consistency with their higher levels of regret as described in Section 4.
The estimation errors using Regret-Minimization in GSP (Figure 8 ) are again consistent with the regret levels described in Section 4 (similar to the error patterns using Regret-Minimization in VCG described in Section 5). First, comparing the Regret-Minimization errors in the two information settings, the errors are higher when bidders are not given with their valuation (DV), but the differences are not statistically significant. Second, in a comparison of errors according to types of players, Regret-Minimization succeeds more in estimating the valuations of the higher-type bidders, but result in very high errors on the lower-type bidders. Specifically, there is a significant negative correlation between estimation error and player-types (N = 60, ρ = −0.59, p < 0.0001). A pairwise comparison between types showed that the estimation error on the lowest type was significantly higher than on each of the other four types (p < 0.05), and that the differences between the other four types were not statistically significant. Table of GSP bidders for value estimates using the Regret-Minimization, Best-Response, and VCG-like-NE methods: the averages and standard deviations of the differences between the value estimates and the true values of the bidders, and the differences between the value estimates using the three methods, as indicated in the first column. Differences that are significantly different from zero are marked by *, **, and *** for significance at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. selections of learning phase). This may suggest that the Regret-Minimization is more robust to whether players know their values. Since real-world bidders are not explicitly given with their values but should learn them as they go, Regret-Minimization might have an advantage when this uncertainty is high.
Figure 16: Differences
In a comparison according to player types (see Figure 8b) , the Regret-Minimization method performs similar to the other two methods. Specifically, similar to the Regret-Minimization results (see above), errors of Best-Response and VCG-like-NE were negatively correlated with the player-types (ρ = −0.47 and ρ = −0.57, respectively, p < 0.001 in both). In addition, when comparing estimation errors for each type separately, the differences between the three methods were not statistically significant. Finally, considering the direction of mistakes, Table 16 shows that the estimations using Regret-Minimization were not in a particular direction relative to the estimations of either of the other two methods.
Possible Improvements
We have seen that the regret-based estimation method gives value estimates that are competitive with the standard econometric methods both in GSP and in VCG. However, we have also seen how all of the methods have quite high errors on the lower type players, who tend not to follow the methods' underlying assumption of rationality. Now the question is: how can we improve the accuracy of estimations?
The first approach one may try is to "clean" the data, i.e., remove outlier observations that might bias the estimates. We would expect that if the value estimates are biased by exceptional behavior, then ignoring these behaviors will improve the accuracy of results. Attempting in this direction on our GSP auctions, we ran preliminary processing where we removed outlier auctions for every player. Specifically, we removed the auction instances where the player's bid was more than 2 standard deviations away from the average of his bids in the second half of the game. Then, we derived value estimates for the GSP bidders from these "cleaned" auctions, using each of the three methods -Regret-Minimization, Best-Response and VCG-like-NE. This did not improve the estimation accuracy, but actually slightly increased the estimation error for Best-Response and VCG-like-NE. Specifically, after removing outliers the error on all GSP bidders was 25.51%, 29.79% and 31.76% using Regret-Minimization, Best-Response and VCG-like-NE, respectively. The errors remained similar or slightly increased also when removing outliers in VCG auctions as well as when considering changes in estimation errors by information setting or by types of players. This shows that the methods' error is not a result of the ends of the bid distributions. Instead, the typical behavior of the players seems to be the source of this error, and thus cleaning the data does not seem to be the right approach here.
A second approach may be to take advantage of the differences between the estimation methods by combining them. The different methods catch different aspects of behavior and may have different sources of mistakes. Therefore, it may be useful to combine the estimates of the different methods. For example, we averaged the estimates of the Regret-Minimization and Average-Bid methods, for each of our VCG bidders, and the estimation error of the combined method was lower than each of the two methods separately (see Figure 17 ).
Finally, we have observed that the estimates of all methods were biased, and that this bias was consistently different for the different types of players. The bias seems to result from systematic differences in behavior between player types, where the lower ranked players tend to (irrationally) play as if their value was higher. Then, if we knew and could correct the bias, how much better could the estimates get? We demonstrate the potential gains of controlling the bias by correcting the estimates of our GSP bidders. For every bidder, we calculated his most frequent position in the auction, and used this information to "un-bias" our estimate according to the average bias of estimates of his (deduced) rank. For example, letv be the estimate using Regret-Minimization of a GSP bidder who was most frequently observed in the last position. Then, since on average Regret-Minimization over-estimates the lowest-type as 137% of his true value (see Table 16 ), we fix the estimate accordingly, so thatv f ixed =v/1.37. This correction of bias significantly improved the results of each of the three methods on the GSP bidders, as Figure 18 : Controlling for rank-based biases: the estimation errors of the three methods on the GSP bidders, before and after fixing for every player his estimate according to the average estimation bias on his deduced-type (determined by his most frequent rank).
can be seen in Figure 18 .
Of course, since these bias-correction factors came from within the sample, one cannot interpret these reduced estimation errors as an improved method. Nevertheless, it does give hope that understanding the behavioral tendencies of players and taking into account the heterogeneity of players of different ranks (relative to the opponents) has the potential of substantially improving the accuracy of estimates. The regret-minimization is a simple and powerful method that can be easily modified to capture different behavioral biases and to take advantage of insights from behavioral disciplines. We leave this as a direction for future research.
